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JAM TOMORROW: DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW
BARBARA STARK*

Abstract: The chasm between the rich and the poor has become unfathomable. This Article asks whether existing international economic law
can bridge this chasm and effectuate distributive justice. "Distributive justice" itself is an ambiguous goal. This Article inquires, as a threshold question, what, exactly, is required for actual "distributive justice". It takes as a
starting point the relatively modest objective of the Millennium Development Goals-to halve the number living in extreme poverty by 2015. It
argues that this objective is not going to be achieved under the aegis of
international economic law for two reasons. First, distributive justice is not
an objective of international economic law. Second, even if the political
will existed, distributive justice would be unattainable because "international economic law" is not a coherent legal subject with the capacity to
make it happen. Neoliberalism cannot be relied upon to produce distributive justice, but neoliberalism is not the only game in town.
"I'm sure I'll take you with pleasure!" the Queen said. "Twopence a
week, and jam every other day."
Alice couldn't help laughing, as she said "I don't want yon to hire
in--and I don't care for jam."
"It's very good jam," said the Queen.
"Well, I don't want any to-day, at any rate."
"You couldn't have it if you did Aant it," the Queen said.
'The rule is, jam to-morrow and jam yesterday-but never jam today."
* Professor of Law and John DeWitt Gregory Research Scholar, Hofstra; Visiting
Scholar, Columbia. L.L.M., Columbia University School of Law; J.D., New York University
School of Law. I am deeply grateful to Tim Sellers, Frank Garcia, Chi Carmody, John
Linarelli, and Sheila Ward for organizing the Symposium on Distributive Justice and International Economic Law, held at Tillar House, Nov. 7, 2008, and for inviting me to participate. Thanks to the American Society of International Law for sponsoring it, and to the
other participants at Tillar House, especially Jeanne Woods, Jeff Dunoff, and Chantal
Thomas, and to Tom Cady, Jim Friedberg, Anne Lofaso, Marjorie McDiarmid, Mike Risch,
Caprice Roberts, John Taylor, and Grace Wigal for their helpful comments, to Debbie
Swiney for her research assistance and to Jennifer Tavares for her expert manuscript
preparation. Hofstra Law School provided generous summer funding.
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"It must come sometimes to 'jam to-day"' Alice objected.
"No, it ca'n't," said the Queen. "It's jam every other day: to-day
isn't any other day, you know."
-Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and 147iat Alice Found There t

INTRODUCTION

The chasm between the world's rich and poor has become unfathomable. As a recent UN study explains, global wealth is distributed so
that "the richest 2 per cent of adult individuals in the world own half of
all global wealth." 2 While the number of people living in poverty has increased by almost 100 million, there are more billionaires than ever before-people who, as Barack Obama put it, "make more in 10 minutes
than a worker makes in 10 months." 3 Even more disturbing, "the assets
I LEWIS

CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There, in THE ANNO-

TATED ALICE: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION 128, 196 (Martin Gardner ed., WAV. Norton & Co.

1999) (1871). "Socialists often used to ridicule the capitalist system as offering the empty
promise of 'Jam tomorrow.'" The Phrase Finder, Jam Tomorrow, http://www.phrases.org.
uk/meanings/211400.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2009). In fact as Labour politician Tony
Benn said in 1969, "Some of the jam we thought was for tomorrow, we've already eaten."
The Phrase Finder, supra.
2 James B. Davies et al., The World Distribution of Household Wealth 7 (United Nations
Univ. World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2008/03, 2008). This distributive inequity has been going on for some time. See, e.g., The U.N. High Comm'r for
Human Rights, Report of the U.M High Comm'rfor Human Rights to the Econ. and Soc. Council,
4-6, U.N. Doc. E/1999/96 P (July 29, 1999), reprinted in HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP
ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHtTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 239 (2d ed.
2000) (noting growing economic polarization, in which the poorest increasingly lose
ground). In the U.S. alone, "from 1997 to 2001, the top 1 percent captured far more of the
real national gain in wage and salary income than did the bottom 50percent." Clive Crook,
The Height of Inequality, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2006, at 36, 37. Until recentl); the rate
of polarization in the U.S. was increasing. See David CayJohnston, Report Says That the Rich
Are Getting Richer Faster Much Faster, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007, at C3 (noting that the increase in income of the top one percent was greater than the total income of the bottom
twenty percent). Wh\rether those at the bottom are nevertheless better off is an open question. The bottom line is unclear. "Most likely [globalization] has helped some to escape
poverty and thrown others deeper into it." PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF
GLOBALIZATION 89 (2d ed. 2004).

3 See Eric Konigsberg, A NAe Class War: The Haves vs. the Have Mores, N.Y TIMES, Nov.
19, 2006, at WVK1 (explaining that the "superrich" -the $20 million a year households"are getting richer almost twice as fast as the rich" -the top one percent of households
with an average income of $940,000); Jeff Zeleny, Obama Proposes Tax Cutfor Middle Class
and Retirees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2007, at A22; see alsoJenny Anderson & Julie Craswell,
Make Less Than $240 Million? You're Off Top Hedge Fund List, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007, at Al
(noting that "the top 25 hedge fund managers last year earned $14 billion-enough to pay
New York City's 80,000 public school teachers for nearly three years"); Stephen Taub, The
Top 25 Moneymnakers: The New Tycoons, ALPHA, Apr. 24, 2007, at 39, 41-42 (noting that the
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of the world's richest three individuals exceeded the combined Gross
National Products of all of the least developed countries, with a popula4
tion totaling 600 million people."
This Article asks whether distributive justice can be realized
through existing international economic law. "Distributive justice" is an
ambiguous goal. If we simply mean "more fair than what we have now,"
"distributive justice" is within easy reach because we could hardly do
worse. Merely rolling back some of the generous de-regulation and outright gifts that have brought us here would be a start, and has already
begun. 5 The global economic crisis has certainly toppled some of the
mighty, but the worst-off may be even worse off, and many are likely to
6
join them.
As a threshold question, it should accordingly be established what,
exactly, is required for actual "distributive justice." I take as a starting
point the relatively modest objective of the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs)-to halve the number living in extreme poverty by

more than $14 billion earned by the top twenty-five hedge fund managers was equivalent
to the GDP of Jordan or Uruguay). An additional 100 million people live in poverty, even
as total world income has increased by 2.5%.JosEPn E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS

DISCONTENTs 5 (2003); see also Oxfam FaultsResponse to Famine in Africa, N.Y. TItMES, Jly 24,
2006, at A10 (noting that "the number of food emergencies has nearly tripled in 20
years").
' SINGER, supra note 2, at 81 (citing UNDP, Human Development Report 1999, at 3) (emphasis added).
See David Leonhardt, A Bold Plan Sweeps Away Reagan Ideas, N.Y TiNIES, Feb. 27, 2009,
at Al (describing President Obama's ten-year budget which, "[m]ore than anything else
•..seek[s] to reverse the rapid increase in economic inequality over the last 30 years" by
increasing taxes on the wealthiest). The budget also allocates $51.7 billion for the State
Department and foreign aid, which puts the United States "on a path to double foreign
assistance," according to the White House. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Help Abroad, N.Y TIMES,
Feb. 27, 2009, at Al 7.
6 See Edmund L. Andrews, Report Projects a Worldwide Economic Slide, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 9,
2009, at B1 (citing economists for the World Bank predicting that "the global economy
and the volume of global trade would both shrink this year for the first time since World
War H .... " with grim consequences for the world's poor); Editorial, The Crisisat Home and
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, at A30 (urging "leaders of industrial nations ...to provide large-scale financial assistance to avert an economic catastrophe in the developing
world"); see, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, Household Wealth Falls by Trillions,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at
BI (noting that while American households lost $5.1 trillion in the last quarter of 2008,
"the loss was concentrated among the most affluent"); Andrew E. Kramer, The Last Days of
the Oligarchs?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at B1 (noting that "few businessmen anywhere have
fallen as hard or as fast in recent months" as Russia's richest men, the top twenty-five of
whom lost $230 billion between May and October); Donald G. McNeil Jr., Global Fund Is
Billions Short as Downturn Cuts Pledges ft-om Donor Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at D6
(noting that pledges from donor states "are running about $5 billion short of what is
needed through 2010").
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2015.7

As economist and Director of the MDGJeffrey Sachs points out,
the wealth is there. 8 It is just a matter of moving it around. 9
My thesis here is that this will not happen under the aegis of international economic law for two reasons. First, distributive justice is not
an objective of international economic law. Rather, its objective is to
maintain the neoliberal economic order, grounded in free markets and
individual autonomy.10 Second, even if the political will were there, it
7 See DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT

2009, at 4 (2009). Although the goal of "development" has not always been so specific, the
general objective of reducing poverty and inequality has characterized a part of the World
Bank called the Liternational Development Association ("IDA") since its inception in
1960. See infra note 12. The extremely poor consist of 1.1 billion humans subsisting on less
that one dollar a day. See The World Bank, Dramatic Decline in Global Poverty, but Progress Uneven, Apr. 23, 2004, http://go.worldbank.org/84RIEOWD20.
8 SeeJEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY 26-50 (2005) (describing the growth of the
global economy). The 2008 global gross domestic product was $60,587,016. WORLD BANK,
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS DATABASE 4 (2009). As recently as Februar); 2009, Sachs

insisted that the wealth was still there, although the wealthy states refused to honor their earlier pledges: "The poor are refused $5 billion, while wealthy countries have found $3 trillion
for bank bailouts and Wall Street bankers auarded themselves $18 billion in ...bonuses
while accepting those bailouts. This is absolutely in violation of the life and death pledges
that the rich world made to the poor." McNeil, supra note 6. But see, e.g., Sanjay Reddy & Antoine Heuty, The End of Poverty? 1, http://www.cohlmbLi.edu/-sr793/endofpoverty.pdf (last
visited Nov. 21, 2009) (noting that Sachs accepts a "questionable orthodox prescription for
economic development").
9 See THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSI7 (2002) (noting that a meaningful reduction of global poverty could

BILmES AND REFORMS

be accomplished through a redistribution of just "1.2% of the aggregate annual gross national incomes of the high income economies."); see also Note, Never Again Should a People
Starve in a World ofPlenty, 121 HARV. L. REv. 1886, 1892 (2008) (urging law students-and
presumably everyone else-to "[d] o the [r]ight [t]
hing at [e] very moment," that is, if, "with

a donation of $200, a child's life can be saved," yot have a moral obligation to do so). But see
PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT, at xi (2007). Collier notes:

Unfortunately, it is not just about giving these countries [where "the bottom billion" live] our money. If it were, it would be relatively easy ....[but]
aid does not work so well in these environments, at least as it has been provided in the past. Change in the societies at the very bottom must come predominantly from within; we cannot impose it on them.
Id.
101 use "neoliberal" here to distinguish a global economy in which "the value of stock
markets has lost all grounding in materiality;" replaced by "casino capitalism," as opposed
to earlier forms of liberalism, grounded in more concrete notions of property. See Jean
Comaroff & John L. Comaroff, MillUennial Capitalism:First Thoughts on a Second Coming, in
MILLENNIAL CAPITALISM AND THE CULTURE OF NEOLIBERALISM 1, 7-8 (Jean Comaroff &
John L. Comaroff eds., 2001). Additionally; a crucial aspect of these fundamental values, as
Carol Gould notes, is a human rights framework that inadequately recognizes basic economic and social rights. See Carol Gould, Approaching GlobalJustice Through Human Rights:
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would not happen because "international economic law" is not a coherent legal subject with the capacity to make it happen." Rather, "international economic law" is a loose collection of international organi12
zations (1Os) used by states to further a range of shifting objectives.
Most recently, states have sought to realize these objectives through the
cluster of premises referred to as the "Washington Consensus."1 3 These
include, according to Kerry Rittich: "[T] hat the implementation of efficiency enhancing rules is an uncontentious goal, that everyone stands
to gain from free trade, that property and contract rights are the paramount legal entitlements, and that rule-based regimes 'level the playing
14
field' and ensure fairness among otherwise unequal parties."
The first argument, that these premises are fundamentally at odds
with distributive justice, draws on Marxist theory.15 The second arguElements of Theory and Practice, in DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW (Chios Carmody et al. eds., forthcoming 2009).
11 This Article draws on critical and postmodern approaches which some commentators perhaps prudently eschew in the context of international economic law. See, e.g., John
Linarelli, Vat Do We Owe Each Other in the GlobalEconomic Order?:Constructivistand Contractual Accounts, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 181, 184 (2006) ("No critical or postmodern
approaches are undertaken.").
12 These 1Os include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank). Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development art. I, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S 134 (setting out mission of the World
Bank to alleviate poverty).
13 World Economic Forum, Death of the Wahshington Consensus?, Jan. 29, 2009,
http://wwcw.weforum.org/en/knowledge/Eveuts/2009/1N_SESSSUMM_26943?url =/en/
kniowledge/Events/2009/KN_SESSSUMM_26943 (summarizing a panel discussion at the
World Economic Forum in Davos). This panel discussion concluded that "[t]alk of the death
of the Washington Consensus is exaggerated, although parts of it will need revision in light of
the global economic crisis. The core principles of consensus-good economic governance,
trade liberalization and fiscal discipline-remain ,alid .... [b] ut, given the controversy surrounding it, the Consensus may need a new name." Id.
14Kerry Rittich, Enchantments of Reason/Coewions of Law, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 727, 73940 (2003); see also David Kennedy, The "Rule of Law, "Political Choices, and Development Conmon Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 95, 129
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) ("[Under the Washington Consensus,] [a]n
economy was now imagined as a 'market' in which individual economic actors transact
with one another .... Government is there less to manage the economy than to support
the market. Moreover, there is no reason to think of economies in nationalterms."); David
M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development Theory
and theEmergence of a New CriticalPractice,in THE NEw LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra, at 1, 17 (discussing critical analyses of development theory).

Yet, Aaron James suggests a fundamental shift in this paradigm toward "structural fairness." See Aaron James, Global Economic Fairness:Internal Principles,in DISTRIBUTtVE JUSTICE
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 10.
15 Marxist theory, of course, is a vast terrain. For a comprehensive introduction to the

subject, see LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, MAIN CURRENTS OF MARXISM: THE FOUNDERS, THE
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ment, that "international economic law" could not produce distributive
justice if all of the participants at the World Economic Forum burst into
The Internationale,draws on postmodern theory. 6 But I propose neither
a Marxist nor a postmodern "solution" to the problem. 17 Rather, I simply hope to show that neoliberalism cannot be relied upon to produce
distributive justice and further that it is not the only game in town.18
Margaret Thatcher's edict, 'There is no alternative," is nonsense worthy
of Alice's Queen. 19

GOLDEN AGE, THE BREAKDOWN (P.S. Falla trans., W.W. Norton & Company 2005) (1978). My
discussion focuses particularly on Marxist theory as recently reassessed by a new generation
of theorists, including international legal scholars such as Susan Marks and Anthony Carty.
See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFT: RE-EXAMINING MARXIST LEGACIES (Susan
Marks ed., 2008).
16The Internationaleis the international song of both Marxist and non-Marxist socialist
parties, written in French by Eugene Pottier after the fall of the Paris Commune of 1871,
and set to the music by P. Degeyter. The Modern Sourcebook, The Internationale, Aug.
1997, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/internat.html. The World Economic Forum,
even in happier years when Bono attended, has been unlikely to burst into song. Indeed,
the group of world leaders and financiers that the German economist Klaus Schwab invited to Davos was markedly somber this year. See Nelson D. Schwartz, At Davos, Economic
Crisis Culls the Guest List, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at B1.
17 See infra Parts II-Conclusion (explaining, respectively, why Marxism, like other
Enlightenment metanarratives, is suspect, and why postmodernism does not provide "solutions"). My arguments are not cumulative, as my aim is not to construct a new metanarrative.
18 See also Barbara Stark, Theories of Poverty/ThePoverty of Theory, 2009 BYU L. Riv. 381,
391-407 (explaining why traditional liberal theory cannot be relied upon for this purpose).
19 See, e.g., CLAIRE BERLINSKI, "THERE Is No ALTERNATIVE": WHY MARGARET THATCHER
MATTERS 148 (2008) (noting that from 1972 to 1992 the average income of the richest tenth
rose sixty-one percent, while the income of the poorest tenth decreased by eighteen percent). As Gardner notes, "In a sense, nonsense itself is a sanity-insanity inversion. The ordinary world is turned upside down and backward; it becomes a world in which things go every
way except the way they are supposed to." CARROLL, supra note 1, at 142 n.5 (commentary of
Martin Gardner, ed.). This is not to downplay, or underestimate, the hegemony of neoliberalism, which many scholars concede. See, e.g., Robert Howse, The End of the GlobalizationDebate:
A Review Essay, 121 HARV. L. REv. 1528, 1529 (2008) (arguing that "by the end of the Cold
War, the old struggle between right and left over the governance of the economy and the
redistribution of wealth within the advanced liberal democracies had yielded to a new promarket consensus.") There is, however, a loyal opposition. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Interliberal
Law: Comment, 94 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 249, 250 (2000) (expressing "extreme skepticism" regarding "any attempt to draw distinctions between 'liberal' and 'non-liberal' states").
There are also outliers, ranging from the "new new left," to globalization's discontents, to the
barbarians at the gate. See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, MULTITUDE: WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF EMPIRE, at xi-xii, 34 (2004); STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 1-7; Thomas
N. Hale & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Hardt & Negri's Multitude: The Worst of Both Worlds, OPENDEMOCRACY, May 25, 2005, http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-isionreflections/
marx_2549.jsp.
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I. A

9

MARXIST CRITIQUE

"Faceit: Marx was partly right about capitalism."
20
-Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury

A. Why Mary Now?

My first argument draws on Karl Marx-not as an economist, but
as a political theorist. 2 1 I draw on Marx because, as Tony Judt points
out, "From first to last, Marxism's strongest suit was . . . 'the moral seri-

ousness of [his] conviction that the destiny of our world as a whole is
tied tip with the condition of its poorest and most disadvantaged members.'

22

hi addition, as Judt further notes, "Marxism ... is now once

again, largely for want of competition, the common currency of international protest movements."23
20Rowan Williams, Face It: Marx W'1as Partly Right About Capitalism,SPECTATOR, Sept. 27,
2008, http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/2172131/face-it-marx-was-partly-rig11t-aboutcapitalism.thtml.
21Marx has been many things to many people. Carol Gould, for example, provides an
original and provocative perspective on Marx. See CAROL C. GOULD, MARX'S SOCIAL ONTOLOGY, at xi (1978) (proposing a new approach to Marx as a "great systemic philosopher
in the tradition of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel"). Marx remains a useful tool for critique,
although the limits of Marxist critique are well-known. As TonyJudt observes, "the predictive powers of Marxian economics have long been discounted even by the left." TonyJudt,
Goodbye to All that?, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 2006, at 88 (reviewingJACQUEs ATrALI, KARL
MARX ou L'ESPRIT DU MONDE (2005); KOLAKOWSKI, supra note 15; and LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, MY CORRECT VIEWS ON EVERYTHING (ZbigniewJanowski ed., 2005)).
22
Judt, supra note 21, at 92. For a rigorous and compelling analysis of the challenge of
attaining both distributive justice and democratic governance, see Chantel Thomas,Democratic Governance, DistributiveJustice and Development, in DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW,

supra note 10.

Judt, supra note 21, at 92. Naomi Klein recently observed, "This is a progressive
moment: it's ours to lose." Larissa MacFarquhar, Outside Agitator: Naomi Klein and the New
New Left, NEW YORKER, Dec. 8, 2008, at 61, 62; see also NAONII KLEIN, TIlE SHOCK DOCTRINE:
THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 466 (2007) ("[L]ocal people's renewal movements
begin from the premise that there is no escape from the substantial messes we have created and ....do not seek to start from scratch but rather from scrap, from the rubble that
is all around."). As Stiglitz notes, Klein is no economist. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Bleakonomics,
N.Y. TIIES BOOK. REv., Sept. 30, 2007, at 12. But she may be right. AsJudt observes:
23

Vhat Marx's nineteenth century contemporaries called the "Social Question"-how to address and overcome huge disparities of wealth and poverty;
and shameful inequalities of health, education and opportunity-may have
been answered in the West (though the gulf between poor and rich, which
once seemed steadily to be closing, has for some years been opening again, in
Britain and above all in the U.S.). But the Social Question is back on the international agenda with a vengeance. What appears to its prosperous beneficiaries as worldwide economic growth ... is increasingly perceived and re-
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Marx has been anathema in the United States for decades. 2 4 Before Senator Joseph McCarthy fell from grace, he eviscerated the
American left; disillusionment with the Soviet brand of Marxism finished the job. 25 As the anti-globalism activist Naomi Klein explains,
My grandparents were pretty hardcore Marxists, and in the
thirties and forties they believed fervently in the dream of
egalitarianism that the Soviet Union represented .... They
had their illusions shattered by the reality of gulags, of extreme repression, hypocrisy, Stalin's pact with Hitler .... The
left has been held accountable for the crimes committed in
the name of its extreme ideologies, and I believe that's been a
very healthy process. 26
The demonization of Marxism has been costly, though. It has chilled
debate, prevented labor, civil rights activists, and feminists from taking
bold positions, and generally inhibited the development of any robust,

sented by millions of others as the redistribution of global wealth for the
benefit of a handful of corporations and holders of capital.
Judt, supra note 21, at 92.
24 Marxism is "out-dated, oversimplified and wrong." Hale & Slaughter, supra note 19;
see also Mark Leibovich, 'Socialism!'Boo,Hiss, Repeat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, at WK1 (noting that "the socialist bogey-mantra has made a full-scale return after a long stretch of relative dormancy" as conservatives attack bank bailouts and stimulus bills).
25 See Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1071, 1075 (1989). For more information on McCarthyism and
its effect on culture, see generally RICHARD M. FREELAND, TIlE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND THE
ORIGINS OF MCCARTHYISM (1972); THOMAS C. REEVES, THE LIFE AND TiIES OF JOE
MCCARTHY: A BIOGRAPHY (1982); and DALTON TRUMBO, The Titme ofthe Toad, in THlE TIME OF
THE TOAD: A STUDY OF INQUISITION IN AMIERICA 3, 9-63 (1972) (discussing "blacklisted"
Hollywood writers).
26 MacFarquhar, supra note 23, at 71; see also David Lodge, Goodbye to All that, N.Y. REV.
BOORS, May 27, 2004, at 6 (reviewing TERRY EAGLETON, AFTER THEORY (2003)) (noting
that Eagleton fails to "explicit[ly] acknowledge[ ]" that Marxism, as implemented in Russia
and Eastern Europe, was "inimical to people's free development."). If such an acknowl-

edgement is required here, this footnote is it.
Klein argues that neoliberals should similarly be held accountable:
When you start issuing policy prescriptions, when you start advising heads of
state, you no longer have the luxury of only being judged on how you think
your ideas will affect the world. You begin having to contend with how they
actually affect the world, even when that reality contradicts all of your utopian
theories.

MacFarquhar, supra note 23, at 71.
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homegrown American socialism.
twenty-five years ago:

27

As David Richards observed almost

[T] he painfllly evident bankruptcy of coherent political philosophy of the American left may have both political and legal
consequences. To address this problem, the American left
must develop a philosophically articulate conviction of the justice of its political ideals. To achieve this development, the left
must understand and publicly acknowledge both its contilurities and discontinuities with the socialist and Marxist perspectives on political philosophy. Unfortunately these perspectives
have traditionally been excluded from serious political discussion in this country This lacuna, exacerbated by recurrent
red-baiting, deprives its of serious discussion of the full range
28
of democratic political alternatives on the left.
Europeans have not been hobbled in the same way In 2004, for
instance, in response to the American invasion of Iraq, a group of
prominent European legal scholars convened the Symposium, Marxism
and InternationalLaw, to explore the causes of the "material economic
woes of international society." 29 Like them, I draw on Marx to explore
what Martti Koskenniemi calls "a sense of the loss of international law's
emancipatory promise, [and] a creeping scepticism about whether
30
there ever was any such project to begin with."

27 See, e.g., Ansley, supra note 25, at 1075 ("All progressive movements for social change in
the United States have been buffeted and weakened by these [anti-communist] winds."); Jon
D. Michaels, To Promote the General Welfare: The Republican Imperative to Enhance Citizenship Welfare Rights, 111 YALE L.J. 1457, 1458 (2002) ("[S]ubstantive welfare rights are completely
anathema to the Lockean tradition."). American resistance to welfare rights has ,affected the
international standing of such rights. See generally Philip Alston, Economic and Social Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 137, 149 (Louis Henkin & John

Hargrove eds., 1994)

(describing international neglect of economic, social, and cultural

rights).
28

David AJ. Richards, Book Review, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1188, 1188 (1985) (reviewing ALMARX AND JUSTICE: THE RADICAL CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM (1982);

LEN E. BUCHANAN,

(1985); and KAI NIELSEN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY: A DEFENSE OF RADICAL EGALITARIANISM (1985)) (footnotes omitted).
29 Anthony Carty, Marxism and InternationalLaw: Perspectives for the American (TwentySTEVEN LUKES, MARXISM AND MORALITY

First Century?, 17 LEIDENJ. INT'L L. 247, 247 (2004); Matthew Craven et al., We Are Teachers

of InternationalLaw, 17

LEIDEN

J. INT'L L. 363, 363 (2004) (stating that a group of Euro-

pean legal scholars came together in reaction to impending war). Some of the essays in the
Symposium were revised and reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFT: REEXAMINING MARXIST LEGACIES, supra note 15.
30 Martti Koskenniemi, What Should InternationalLawyers Learnfrom Karl Marx?, 17 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 229, 229 (2004). Like Koskenniemi, I am "using Marx in an instrumental
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B. Ideology
The important concept here is Marx's idea of ideology, that is, the
notion that power relations shape the way we think. 31 As Marx succinctly put it, 'The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of

its ruling class."3 2 Today the "ruling class" is made up of those who
drive the neoliberal economic order, including industrialized states and
transnational corporations. As Peter Singer notes,
One hundred and fifty years ago, Karl Marx gave a onesentence summary of his theory of history: 'The hand mill
gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam mill, society
with the industrial capitalist." Today he could have added: 'The
jet plane, the telephone, and the Internet give you a global society with the transnational corporation and the World Eco33
nomic Forum."
Singer's observation rings true because, from a Marxist perspective,
international law has supported the ruling class for a long time. As
Susan Marks explains, in the 1920s the Russian jurist E.B. Pashukanis
described how capitalist states banded together, dividing the world into
states which were "ciilized" and those which were not. 34 The former,

consisting of those states which had adopted capitalism, were entitled
to the protection of international law. The latter, "the remainder of the
world," were "considered as a simple object of [the capitalist states']
completed transactions." 35 Susan Marks also discusses the work of Antony Anghie, who has shown how colonialism shaped international

and heretical fashion, in order to assist in a project that can scarcely be called Marxian in
any traditional sense." Id. at 230.
31 Critical legal scholars, critical race scholars, and feminists, among others, have gotten considerable mileage from this idea. "Marxism, in short, was the 'deep structure' of
much progressive politics. Marxist language, or a language parasitic upon Marxist categories, gave form and an implicit coherence to many kinds of modern political protest: from
social democracy to radical feminism." Judt, supra note 21, at 8; see also Slavoj Zi2ek, The
Spectre of Ideology, in MAPPING IDEOLOGY 1, 1-3 (Slavoj Zi2ek ed., 1994).
32Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communuist Party, in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER 469, 489 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). As Susan Marks points out, "[Tihe
problem with ideology is not that it involves error, but that it sustains privilege." Susan
Marks, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFT: RE-EXAMINING MARXIST LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 1, 8.
33SINGER, supra note 2, at 10.
34See Susan Marks, Empires Law, 10 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 449, 456-57 (2003).
35Id.
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law.3 6 The influence of colonialism can be gleaned from the example of
Francisco de Victoria, who "legitimate [d] Spanish conquest and dispossession in the Americas by defining the peoples of the region as nonsovereign." 37 Marks concludes by urging scholars of globalization not to
neglect the manner in which its "processes intersect with and reproduce pre-existing forms of exploitation and exclusion."3 8 Failure to
note these underlying motifs would perpetuate a "long and inglorious
tradition in international legal scholarship... of covering up for international law," as revealed through the works of those like Pashukanis
39
and Anghie.
Just as capitalist states shaped international law in the 1920s, and
colonialism shaped early international conceptions of sovereignty, today neoliberal ideology shapes the institutions, such as the IMF, the
World Bank, the WTO, and even the non-binding MDG, that purport
to restrain it.4° These institutions, whose policies collectively account
36

See id. at 547; see also ANTONY

ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 223-25 (2005) (arguing that international law is deeply grounded
in colonialism).
37 See Marks, supra note 34, at 458. Marks demonstrates her point with a historical example: empire. She sets out a detailed account of Hardt and Negri's description of empire,
which she agrees is qualitatively different from earlier forms of imperialism. See id. at 46162. Marks's admonition is buttressed by Hardt and Negri's, finding that a primary difference between empire and its imperial predecessors was a change in the "structures of
domination," in part through a process of "deterritorialization." Id. at 463-64.
38 Id. at 464.
39 Id.; see Howse, supra note 19, at 1529. Howse discussesJfirgen Habermas's definition
of globalization, stating:
[T]he cumulative processes of a worldwide expansion of trade and production, commodity and financial markets, fashions, the media and computer
programs, news and communications networks, transportation systems and
flows of migration, the risks generated by large-scale technology, environmental damage and epidemics, as well as organized crime and terrorism.
Howse, supra note 19, at 1529 (quotingjfJRGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST 175 (Ciaran Cronin ed. & trans., 2006)).
40 See DEP'T Or Soc. & ECON. AFFAIRS, supra note 7; Jos&E. Alvarez, FactorsDriving and
Constrainingthe Incorporation of InternationalLaw in IVTO Adjudication, in THE XWTO: GovERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 611, 611 (Merit E. Janow et
al. eds., 2008); Chios Carmody, A Theory of 1I'O Law, 11 J. INT'L ECON. LAW 527, 527
(2008) (stating that there is a general political liberal theory behind the VtTO but no established legal theory); ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING
AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD

72 (1995) (explaining how the Bretton Woods insti-

tutions supported the private sector by expanding domestic and foreign markets); Fernando Teson, Free Trade, in DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW,
supra note 10 (providing a thought-provoking defense of free trade). For a comprehensive
and groundbreaking critique, see FRANKJ. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE: ToWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST TRADE (2003).
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for what we understand to be international economic law, arose postWorld War II. In fact, the World Bank was established by those who met
at Bretton Woods in 1944 to finance reconstruction in Europe after
World War 11.41 In 1960, the International Development Association
(IDA) was established within the World Bank to focus on the needs of
the poorest states. 42 Although that objective was expressly defined, it is
clear that distributive justice has never been the focus of international
economic law. Rather, that law, operating through the institutions of
the IMF and the WTO, has focused more on trade. 43 The premise behind this fixation on trade is that "boosting economic growth" through
trade is key to reducing "poverty and inequality."44
This premise, however, has been criticized as the self-serving ideology of the developed states. Indeed, according to Arturo Escobar, liberal ideology has shaped development discourse for its own purpose
beginning with the "discovery" of poverty after World War 11. 45 Accord41 Elizabeth A. Mandeville, United Nations Development Programme, in 5 OXFORD ENCY-

HUMAN RIGHTS 150, 150-51 (David P. Forsythe ed., 2009) ("[Post World-War
II, there were] two new grand efforts in international cooperation and relations-the human rights movement, which sought to assure that these political and civil rights were
globally afforded and protected, and the development movement, which sought to create
standards of living and institutions of support in the development world to foster economies (and thus societies) in which these freedoms could be guaranteed."). See generally
BARRY CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 483-84 (4th ed. 2003); STIGLITZ, supra note 3,
at 11-12 (explaining the economic theory behind the Bretton Woods institutions).
42 CARTER ET AL., supra note 41, at 485.
43This focus is consistent with its liberal roots. Those who shaped post-Cold War approaches to poverty similarly drew on a wide range of well-known liberal philosophers.
John Rawls, a leading American moral and political philosopher, is conspicuously absent in
part because he did not address the concerns of internationalists. See, e.g., SINGER, supra
note 2, at 8-9 (recalling his astonishment that John Rawls could completely ignore "extremes of wealth and poverty that exist between different societies [and in] the most influential work on justice written in twentieth-century America, this question never even
arises );see also Joel P. Trachtman, Welcome to Cosmopolis, World of Boundless Opportunity, 39
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 477, 488-98 (2006) (providing an incisive critique of Rawls). When
Rawls eventually did address global justice issues, he contemplated closed societies that
generally did not have obligations to aid each other. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES
115-19 (1999) (defending closed societies on "moral hazard" grounds; that is, if people
may freely migrate to more prosperous places, they will have no incentive to invest their
time and effort in the poorer places where they are born).
44 See ESCOBAR, supra note 40, at 21-24.
45 See id. at 21 (describing the "discovery" of mass poverty in Asia, Africa, and Latin
American after World War II); see also Marks, supra note 32, at 13. ("[T]he production of
'under-development' is not simply spontaneous.... [I] t entails the use of coercive force.").
As Majid Rahnema has noted,
CLOPEDIA OF

[N]obody ...seems to have a clear, and commonly shared, view of poverty.
For one reason, almost all the definitions given to the word are woven around
the concept of 'lack' or 'deficiency.' This notion reflects only the basic relativ-
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ing to Escobar, although development promises a "kingdom of abnndance [,] ... the discourse and strategy of development [has] produced
its opposite: massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold
exploitation and oppression, [including] [t] he debt crisis, the Sahelian
famine, increasing poverty malnutrition, and violence." 46 Although
there have been isolated successes, the failures of development have
been well-documented as Escobar describes. 47 These shortcomings include the failure to improve the material lives of the world's poor, to
get twelve cent medicines to children to prevent malaria, and to provide four dollar bed nets to poor families despite spending $2.3 trillion
on foreign aid. 48 Even worse, some critics believe development has continued the destructive processes of colonialism by eviscerating local cultures and by draining least developed countries (LDCs) of their most
valuable resources, from oil and gold to the best educated young people and even healthy babies. 49 Development has been a failure, these
ity of the concept. What is necessary and to whom? And who is qualified to
defime all that?
Escobar, supra note 40, at 21 (quoting MAjHD RAHNEMA, GLOBAL POVERTY: A PAUPERIZING
MVTH (1991)).
46 ESCOBAR, supra note 40, at 4. This apparent paradox of development is nothing new.
See id. But see WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST'S EFFORTS
TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND So LITTLE GOOD 271 (2006) (citing Harvard historian Niall Ferguson for the proposition that there is "such a thing as liberal imperialism and that on balance it was a good thing. ... II many cases of economic 'backwardness' a liberal empire can do better than a nation state.") (quoting NIALL FERGUSON,
COLOSSUS: THE PRICE OF AMERICA'S EMPIRE 198 (2004)); Amartya Sen, The Man Without a
Plan, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2006, at 174 (acknowledging Ferguson's proposition).
See generally 50 YEARS Is ENOUGH: THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANE AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

(Kevin Danaher ed., 1994) (collecting a number of works which

criticize the World Bank's "progress").
47 See ESCOBAR, supra note 40, at 21; Sen, supra note 46, at 172 (describing "success of
many international aid efforts"); see also MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BANKER TO THE POOR: MICROLENDING AND THE BATTLE AGAINST WORLD POVERTY 62-63, 110-12 (2003) (describing
origins and successes of the Grameen Bank and its microfinancing projects).
48 Virginia Postrel, The Poverty Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, at A12 ("The West is
not stingy. It is ineffective."); see EASTERLY, supra note 46, at 13-14 (2006). "[W]hen agencies hand out free nets, they are often diverted to the black market ... [and) wind up being used as fishing nets or wedding veils." EASTERLY, supra note 46, at 13. In Zambia, for
example, seventy percent of the recipients of free nets did not use them. Id. Yet, in contrast, in Malawi, a program through which nets were sold for a nominal amount increased
the number of young children who slept "under nets from 8 percent in 2000 to 55 percent
in 2004." Id. Almost all of those who paid for the nets used them. Id.
49 See, e.g., Jane Jenson & Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Case Studies and Common Trends
in Globalization:Introduction, in GLOBALIZING INSTITUTIONS: CASE STUDIES IN REGULATIONS
AND INNOVATION 9, 11 (JaneJenson & Boaventura de Sousa Santos eds., 2000) (defining
globalization as "the process by which a given local condition or entity succeeds in . . . extending its reach over the globe and, in by doing so, develops the capacity to designate a
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critics contend, but only for the LDCs. It has been quite profitable for
50
the West.
C. Money Flows Uphill
It has been argued that development has not only benefited the
industrial Western states more than it has benefited the LDCs, but that
it has done so at the expense of the LDCs. First, as Oxfam and others
have pointed out, a significant portion of aid dollars never leaves the
developed states.5 1 Rather, it is spent on paying the salaries of consultants, bureaucrats and technical advisors.5 2 Even aid dollars that actually
arrive in the LDCs may not reach their intended beneficiaries. 5 3 Paul
Collier describes a 2004 survey trackhig funds intended for rural health
clinics in Chad:
The survey had the extremely modest purpose of finding
out how much of the money actually reached the clinics-not
whether the clinics spent it well, or whether staff of the clinics
knew what they were doing, just where the money went.
Amazingly, less than 1 percent of it reached the clinics-99
54
percent failed to reach its destination.

rival social condition or entity as local"); Edward W. Said, Yeats and Decolonization, in NATIONALISM, COLONIALISM, AND LITERATURE 69, 69-71 (Terry Eagleton et al. eds., 1990)

("By the beginning of World War I, Europe and America held 85 percent of the earth's
surface in some sort of colonial subjugation. This .. . did not happen in a fit of absentminded whimsy or as a result of a distracted shopping spree."); Robert S. Gordon, The New
Chinese Export: Ophancd Children-An Overview of Adoption of Childrenfront China, 10 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 121, 129 (1997) (describing the perception of babies as exports); see also infra
text accompanying notes 147-151 (describing the New International Economic Order).
Nevertheless, others view babies as the most vulnerable refugees. See ELIZABETH BARTIOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITrCS OF PARENTING 143 (1993); Howard
Altstein & RitaJ. Simon, Introduction to INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: A MULTINATIONAL PER-

SPECTIVE 1, 13 (Howard Altstein & RitaJ. Simon eds., 1991).
50 See, e.g., OxEAM AM., SMART DEVELOPMIENT: WHY U.S. FOREIGN AID DEMANDS MA-

JOR REFORM 19, 22, 24 (2008).
51 See id. at 24.

52See id. at 19, 22, 24 (pointing out that the United States frequently includes clawback
provisions in aid packages); see also COLLIER, supra note 9, at 4 ("The World Bank has large
offices in every major middle-income country but not a single person residing in the Central African Republic.").
53See COLLIER, supra note 9, at 66.
54 Id.; see alsoJan M. Rosen, EnsuringThat Gifts Go Where They're Needed, N.Y TrMES, Nov.
11, 2008, at F26. As Easterly argues, "[i] t's time for the rich-country public to insist that aid
money actually reaches the poor." EASTERLY, supra note 46, at 207.
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Even where corruption takes less of a bite, Collier and Anke Hoeffler
estimate that about eleven percent of aid is diverted to the military, and
in Africa, such aid supports approximately forty percent of military
spending. 55 Finally, even when aid actually reaches its intended beneficiaries, it is subject to diminishing returns.5 6 In other words, "the first
million dollars is more productive than the second, and so on." 5 7 Generally, when aid exceeds about sixteen percent of GDP, it is no longer
effective. 58 In 2007, aid to Africa was approaching that figure.59 This
statistic suggests that soon "we [will] have broadly reached the limits to
60
aid absorption, at least under existing modalities."
Second, loans to developing states have often been more beneficial to their lenders than to the recipient states. 61 While credit has been
extended, even when it has not been sought, it is invariably given on
the creditor's terms. 62 During the financial crises in East Asia and Latin
America, for example, the IMF provided money for what Nobel prizewinning economist Joseph Stiglitz describes as a "bail-out for Western
banks." 63 That is, Western banks and investors were repaid but the
debtor states were left with the loans. 64 These loans were often conditioned on rigid structural adjustment plans (SAPs), under which borrowing states were required to tighten their belts and slash social safety
nets. 65 In addition, most risks remained with the borrower. This condi-

-5 COLLIER, supra note 9, at 103; see also Elizabeth Powers, Greed, Guns and Grist: U.S.
Military Assistance and Arms Transfersto Developing Countries, 84 N.D. L. REV. 383, 383 (2008)
(explaining the billions in military assistance money spent each year and that many recipients use this money, not for military assistance purposes, but instead for "international
antagonism and repression of their citizens").
56 See COLLIER, supra note 9, at 100.
57 Id.
58 Id. (citing The Center for Global Development).
59 Id.
6 Id.
6
' JOSEPH STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 216 (2007).
62 Id. at 217.
63 Id.
64

1d.

65 See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, TIlE NEW IMPERIALISM 167 (2003) (describing literally hun-

dreds of protests against IMF-imposed austerity programmes .... "); Rogers 14. Smith, Beyond
Sovereignty and Unifonity: The Challengesfor Equal Citizenship in the Twenty-first Century, 122
HARV. L. Rrv. 907, 911(2009) (reviewing LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DiLEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2008); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WVAITING: TlE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); and
PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSH iP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION (2008))
(noting that international financial institutions have "restricted and sometimes restructured"
domestic institutions and policies); Galit A. Sarfaty, Note, The 'orld Bank and the Internaliza-
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tion was equally damaging because when exchange rates or interest
rates changed, the borrowing state still had to meet its obligation. Indeed, because most loans were payable on demand, those obligations
66
often became due precisely when they were hardest to pay.
Third, the current system of global reserves is an ongoing source
of low cost loans for the West, especially the United States, but a formidable obstacle to investment in infrastructure for LDCs. After the credit
crises in Asia and Latin America during the 1990s, LDCs began to hold
reserves to back their currencies. 67 Before the 1970s, the conventional
wisdom was that states needed gold to back their currencies. Now, the
idea is that they need "confidence," which can be grounded in a strong
currency such as the U.S. dollar.
LDCs used to hold reserves of three to four months' imports, but
now, they generally hold reserves worth up to eight months of imports. 68 China, for example, has $900 billion reserved, mostly in U.S.
Treasury bills. 69 These are low interest investments, and more importantly, represent capital that China cannot invest in its own infrastructure. 70 If an Asian enterprise borrows $100 million from a U.S. bank,
the state adds $100 million to reserves. 71 Thus, because the state has to
have currency reserves equal to the debt, the loans are a wash. For this
reason, Stiglitz concludes: "The global financial system is not working
well ...

especially for developing countries. Money is flowing uphill,

from the poor to the rich. The richest country in the world, the United
States, ...

borrow[s] $2 billion a day from poorer countries." 72 This

influx of wealth to the United States is part debt repayment and part
global reserves. Consequently, development schemes promoted by

tion of Indigentous Rights Norms, 114 YALE L. J. 1791, 1796-800 (2005) (explaining how the
World Bank shapes the domestic law of borrowing states).
6 STIGLITZ, supra note 61, at 218-19.
67 See id.; see also Paul Krugman, Revenge of the Glut, N.Y. TIAIES, Mar. 2, 2009, at A23
(explaining that after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the emerging Asian economies "began protecting themselves by amassing huge war chests of foreign assets, in effect
exporting capital to the rest of the world").
6 STIGLITZ, supra note 61, at 247.
6 Id. at 248.
70 See id. But see David Barboza, China Unveils Sweeping Plan for Econony, N.Y TIMEs, Nov.
9, 2008, at Al (describing China's plan to invest $586 billion in infrastructure over the
next two years).
71Stiglitz, supra note 61, at 249.
72Id. at 245.
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these same Western neoliberals who rely on these low cost loans are not
likely to reverse this inequitable flow. 73

Fourth, global trade regimes likewise continue to benefit developed
states at the expense of LDCs. Contrary to presumptions otherwise,
trade liberalization does not "make everyone better off." Rather, even
when it makes "the country as a whole better off, it results in some
groups being worse off."74 The rules for world trade are established
through periodic negotiations or "rounds" of talks among the members
of the W-TO, whose agendas are set by the wealthy industrialized states.
The Uruguay Round, for instance, promised a "Grand Bargain" in
which the LDCs would accept new rules on intellectual property; investments and services in exchange for a reduction of agricultural subsidies and textiles quotas in the industrialized states. 75 In reality, only the
industrialized states benefited from the Grand Bargain. Sub-Saharan
Africa lost $1.2 billion. 76 Industrialized countries made no concessions
77
on agricultural subsidies and left textile quotas in place for ten years.
Nonetheless, Eleanor Fox has observed that the elimination of subsidies
by the WTO Member States would be the single most effective and farreaching measure to improve human welfare in the developing world.
She explains:
"The human costs of unfair trade are immense. If Africa,
East Asia, South Asia, and Latin America were each to increase their share of world exports by one per cent the resulting gains in income could lift 128 million people out of poverty. ..."

See Audre Lourde, The Master's Tools W ill
Never Dismantle the Master's House, in THIS
My BACK 98, 99 (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 1981) ("The
master's tools will never dismantle the master's house."). Development schemes promoted
by China, in contrast, may well limit the flow of credit to the West. See Barboza, supra note
70.
74 STIGLITZ, supra note 61, at 68.
75Id. at 77.
73

BRIDGE CALLED

76

Id

77The United States opened its markets to African cotton producers in 2005. Id. at 80-

81. Though the U.S. does not import cotton, cotton subsidies make it the world's largest
cotton exporter and effectively make competition by the LDCs impossible. Id. at 85-86; see
also Kenneth A. Bamberger & Andrew Guzman, Keeping Inports Safe: A Proposalfor Discriminatory Regulation of International Trade, 96 CAL. L. REv. 1405, 1445 (2008) (arguing that
encouraging competition among United States and foreign companies, while simultaneously enforcing safety regulations, would significantly benefit U.S. consumers).
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If the nations of the INTO were to adopt one and only one
human welfare measure, elimination of [subsidies in trade
78
barriers] should be the measure.
Indeed, "[r]ich countries have cost poor countries three times more in
79
trade restrictions than they give in total development aid."
Five years after the VITO's Uruguay Round, protesters disrupted
the next round scheduled to begin Seattle in 1999. Following the debacle of the "Battle in Seattle," the Wl'TO convened in a more remote location-Doha, Qatar-to avoid large protests. 80 The Doha Round was
touted as a "development round," but again, there were few real con-

cessions to the LDCs. 81 This seemingly unalterable trend would not
have surprised Marx, who concluded his monograph On the Question of
Free Trade "To sum up, what is Free Trade under the present condition
82
of society? [It is] Freedom of Capital. "

78Eleanor M. Fox, Globalization and Human Rights: Looking Out for the Welfare of the Worst
Off 35 N.YU. J. INT'L L. & POL. 201, 211 (2002) (quoting OXFAM INT'L, RIGGED RULES
AND DOUBLE STANDARDS: TRADE GLOBALISATION,

AND THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY 5

(2002)). But see DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
REPORT 2007, at 28 (2007) (noting that the elimination of trade barriers benefits some
LDCs at the expense of others).
79STIGLITZ, supra note 61, at 78.
80 See The Battle in Seattle, ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 1999, at 21; Paul Reynolds, Eyewitness:
The Battle of Seattle, BBC NEWS, Dec. 2, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/amerciis/
547581.stm (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). See Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade,
Labor Rights, and Societal Vahes, 22 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 61, 61-89 (2001) for a perceptive account of what was at stake. Various scholars have analyzed the "Battle of Seattle" in
the larger context of global governance. See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore, Authority and Legitiuacy in Global Governance: Deliberation, InstitutionalDifferentiation, and the Codex Alimentarits,81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 766, 779 n.62, 780 n.63 (2006); Richard B. Bilder & Richard Falk,
Recent Books on InternationalLaw Book Review, 96 AM.J. INT'L L. 264, 267 (2002) (reviewing
SUSAN

MARKS,

THE RIDDLE OF ALL CONSTITUTIONS:

INTERNATIONAL LAW, DEMOCRACY,

AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY (2000) and GREGORY H. Fox & BRAD R. ROTH, DEMOC-

(2000)).
8 Some argued that the collapse of the Doha Round of WTO talks precluded agreement on effective measures to "lift millions out of poverty, curb rich countries' ruinous
farm support and open markets for countless goods and services." The Future of Globalisation, ECONOMIST, July 29, 2006, at 11.
8-' Karl Marx, On the Question of Free Trade (Jan. 9, 1848), in MICHELINE R. ISIIAY,
RATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAw

THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER 228, 228 (2007). Marx stated:

But, generally speaking, the Protective system in these days is conservative,
while the free trade system works destructively. It breaks up old nationalities
and carries antagonism of proletariat and bourgeoisie to the utter-most point.
In a word, the Free Trade system hastens the social revolution. In this revolutionary sense alone, gentleman, Iam in favor of free trade.
Id. at 229.

2010]

DistributiveJustice and the Limits of InternationalEconomic Law

Finall; the West has benefited politically as well as economically
from the fiasco of development. During the Cold War, for example, aid
was used to buy political support. As a result, a brutal lineup of dictators and crooks, whose only redeeming quality was their opposition to
the Sovriets, received aid from the West.8 3 Thus, as Stiglitz notes, although most of those dictators are gone now, their people continue to
struggle wvith the specter of their "odious debts." 84 Under Mobutu, for
example, then-Zaire took on $8 billion in debt while its leader amassed
a fortune estimated to be between $5-10 billion.8 5 As Stiglitz notes,
"Chileans today are repaying the debts incurred during the Pinochet
6
regime, South Africans the debts incurred during apartheid."8
Marx probably would have been critical of the ideology of aid, just
as he was critical of the ideology of rights. 8 7 As noted above, he explic-

3 See Mobutu's Xanadu, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 26, 1999, at 82 (describing Gbadolite, a
remote village in the Congo as an eerie wasteland which dictator Mobutu once filled with
three palaces, a high-rise luxury hotel and conference center). The Soviets, of course, were
likewise buying support. See, e.g., Barry Bearak, In Crisis, Zimbabwe Asks: Could Mugabe Lose?,
N.Y TIMES, Mar. 7, 2008, at Al (describing the decades of Mugabe's rule, during which he
mutated from a revolutionary leader to a tyrant who has led his country to a surreal national inflation rate of 100,000%).
84 See STIGLITZ, supra note 61, at 238-41; see also RAYMOND FISMAN & EDWARD MIGUEL,

3-15 (2008)
(explaining how corrupt regimes thrive and their effect on economic development); David
A. Skeel,Jr., Governance in the Ruins, 122 HARV. L. REv. 696, 697-99 (2008) (reviewing CURTIS
EcONONhIC GANGSTERS: CORRUPTION, VIOLENCE AND THE POVERTY OF NATIONS

J. MILHAUPT

&

KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORTE CRISES REVEAL

ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND EcONOMIc DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD

(2008)) (noting

links between corporate crises and economic development).
85 STIGLITZ,

supra note 61, at 229.

Id. Examples of Western leaders fraternizing with corrupt and tyrannical regimes
are not limited to the distant past. During Bill Clinton's presidential campaign, for example, he criticized George H.W. Bush, for "coddl[ing] dictators[,] stand [ing] aside from the
global movement toward democracies [and] prefer[ing] a foreign policy that embrace[d]
stability at the expense of freedom." Harold Hongju Koh, The "HaitiParadigm" in United
States Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391, 2427 n.206 (1994) (quoting President William Clinton, Speech to the University of Wisconsin Institute of World Affairs (Oct. 1,
1992)).
87 As Marx explained:
86

None of the supposed rights of man, therefore, go beyond the egoistic man,
man as he is, as a member of civil society; that is, an individual separated from
the community, withdrawn into himself, wholly preoccupied with his private
interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice. Man is far from being considered, in the rights of man, as a species-being; on the contrary, species-life itself-society-appears as a system which is external to the individual
and as a limitation of his original independence. The only bond between
men is natural necessit) need and private interest, the preservation of their
property and their egoistic persons.
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itly equated "free trade" with "freedom of capital." 88 But as Susan Marks
notes, "international law was not part of his project." 89 Nevertheless, no
one today argues that global capitalism is monolithic. In fact, as explained in Part II, a growing number of legal scholars recognize that
the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, and the MDG might not be able to
agree upon objectives, or coordinate their efforts, even if they wanted. 90
II. A POSTMODERN

CRITIQUE

While "many doubt whether the term [postmodernism] can ever
be dignified by conceptual coherence," two well-known definitions are
pertinent here.9 1 First, as Jean-Franois Lyotard defines it, "Postnodernism [is] incredulity toward metanarratives." 92 Like Marxists, postmodernists challenge the metanarrative of development and the broader
metanarrative of liberalism of which it is a part. For postmodernists, it is
not that liberalism is the wrong metanarrative, but that all metanarratives-including Marxism, liberalism, religion, and the Enlightenment
itself-are suspect.9 3 Second, as FredricJameson suggests, "postmodernism is the cultural logic of late capitalism." 94 Examining the metanarraKarl Marx, On theJavish Question, as reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS, at 54, 56 (Louis Henken et
al. eds., 1999).
88See Marx, supra note 82, at 39. As Marx notes, "[The Bourgeoisie] has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom-Free Trade." KARL MARX, COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 82 (Penguin Books 1985) (1888).
89Marks, supra note 32, at 16.
90 See, e.g., Andrew Guzman, Trade, Labor Legitimacy, 91 CAL. L. REv. 885, 885-89
(2003) (discussing the dilemmas within the integration of the ILO Core Rights Labor Standards into the WTO); Chantal Thomas, Should the World Trade OrganizationIncorporateLabor
and Environmental Standards?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347, 379-86, 401-03 (2004) (explaining some of the difficulties in negotiating common agreements); Elissa Alben, Note,
GATT and the Fair Wage: A HistoricalPerspective on the Labor-TradeLink, 101 COLUM. L. REv.
1410, 1411-20 (2001) (putting the relationship between labor and trade in historical perspective).
91Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi, The Theory and Politics of Postmodernism, in POSTMODERNISM
AND SOCIETY 1, 9 (Roy Boyne & Ali Ranttansi eds., 1990).
92
JEAN-FRANCoIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE,
at xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984) (1979). "Metanarrative" refers to
an all-encompassing story that promises to explain everything. See, e.g., KOLAKOWSKI, supra
note 15, at 356 (describing the "orthodox majority" which "maintained that Marxist doctrine itself contained the answers to all or most of the problems of philosophy").
93 SeeJudt, supra note 21, at 91 ("The Marxist project ...was one strand in the great
progressive narrative of our time: it shares with classical liberalism, its antithetical historical twin, that narrative's optimistic, rationalistic account of modern society and its possibilities.").
94 FREDRICJAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM,

at xv (1991).
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tive of development with Lyotard's incredulity exposes its theoretical
flaws. Then analyzing development in Jameson's terms shows how this
flawed metanarrative actually plays out in contemporary global culture.
A. Incredulity Toward Metanarratives
The metanarrative of the Enlightenment replaced God with Reason, and religion with science. 95 Although the Enlightenment was
deeply committed to humanism, reason and science do not inevitably
lead to progress and human good. 96 Indeed, some have noted the role
of the Enlightenment itself in the Holocaust. 97 After all, the "final solution" was not a barbarian rampage, but an orderly, systematic, "scientific" program of genocide, bureaucratic and perversely "rational."98
For postmodernists, all metanarratives have their own "will to
power."99 They tell us more about the ambitions of their proponents
than about the world they claim to explain. For liberalism, the "univer-

95 The substitution of Reason for God, of course, was not so neat. It has been suggested, for example, that God was not entirely replaced by reason. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag,
Law as a Continuation of God by Others Means, 85 CAL. L. REV. 427, 427-28 (1997) (explaining how legal arguments replicate various proofs of the existence of God).
96 See Peter Gay, The Science of Man and Society, in THE ENLIGHTENMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE ANTHOLOGY 479, 481 (Peter Gay ed., 1973) (observing that "[t]he philosophers were
aware that their enterprise concealed a deep tension: knowledge did not always lead to
improvement") (emphasis omitted).
97 See MAX HORKHEIMER & TIHEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
168-69 (John Cummings trans., The Continuum Publ'g Co. 1987) (1944). According to
John Gray, the Enlightenment contemplated "the creation of a single worldwide civilization."JoHN GRAY, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 2 (1998). Hence
the United States, "the last great power to base its policies on this enlightenment thesis,"
seeks the global domination of democratic capitalism, a 'single universal free market." Id.
98 See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCIEIES TO IMPROVE THE
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 2-10 (1998) (arguing that states seek to make the life of
society "legible" in order to make it controllable by political power); see alsoJudt, supra
note 21, at 92 ("As for those who dream of rerunning the Marxist tape, digitally remastered and free of irritating Communist scratches, they would be well advised to ask sooner
rather than later just what it is about all-embracing 'systems' of thought that lead inexorably to all-embracing 'systems' of rule.").
99 The phrase is Nietzsche's. See GILLIAN ROSE, THE MELANCHOLY SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THOUGHT OF THEODOR W. ADORNO 19 (1978) ("Nietzsche, according to
Adorno, refused 'complicity with the world' which . . . comes to mean rejecting the prevalent norms and values of society on the ground that they have come to legitimise a society
that in no way corresponds to them-they have become 'lies.'"). This includes those who
view "Universalism," or secular Western Universalism, as a Western "will to power" or quest
for hegemony. This critique may be addressed to radicals as well as liberals. See, e.g., Eve
Darian-Smith, Power in Paradise: The PoliticalIniplications of Santos's Utopia, 23 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 81, 86 (1998) (concluding that Santos' goal "is, above all, modernist: it conceals
relations of power in the march toward emancipation of the oppressed").
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sal" subject turns out to be a Western white man. 100 As Pierre Schlag
explains,
[P]ostmodernism questions the integrity, the coherence,
and the actual identity of the humanist individual self ...For
postmodernism, this humanist individual subject is a construction of texts, discourses, and institutions. The promise
that this particular human agent would realize freedom,
autonomy etc., has turned out to be just so much Kant. 10 1
The liberal metanarrative of "development," similarly, may sustain
liberals but its value for its purported beneficiaries is less clear. 102 As Bob
Sutcliffe explains, the metanarrative of development is captured in the
metaphor of a journey-nation states start from roughly the same place,
but at different times. 103 Thus, the LDCs are today where Europe was in
the fourteenth century. For Sutcliffe, "The form of travel is characterized by the transfer of labour from low-productivity agriculture to
higher-productivity industry and modern services." 10 4 But everyone
ends up at the same place, with high consumption matching high productivity. Economic progress brings electricity, toilets, education, urbanization, medical services, longer lives, democracy, and human
rights-in short, modernization.
The metanarrative of development has given rise to three major
critiques. Each challenges one of its underlying premises. First, the polarization critique argues that everyone does not end up in the same
100See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in InternationalLaw, 93 AM. J.INT'L L.
379, 383 (1999) ("International law asserts a generality and universality that can appear
strikingly incongruous in an international community made up of almost two hundred
different nationalities and many more cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic groups.").
101PIERRE SCHLAG, Normative and Nowhere to Go, in LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 24 (1996).
102 See, e.g., Sen, supra note 46, at 2 (noting that "Easterly's critique is not confined to
foreign aid as it is usually defined; it is a critique of all grand plans to save the world
hatched in Washington or London or Paris").
103 See Bob Sutcliffe, The Place ofDevelopment in Theories of Imperialism and Globalization, in
CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY: CONTRmIBUTIONS TO A NEW PARADIGM 135, 135 (Ronald
Munck & Denis O'Hearn eds., 1999). Chin Leng Lira seems to eschew the development
metanarrative in favor of empirical analyses of actual claims. See Chin Leng Lim, The Conventional Morality of Trade, in DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, Supra
note 10. This approach resonates with the New Legal Realism. See Howard Erlanger et al., Is It
Timefor a New Legal Realism?, 2005 Wisc. L. REv. 335, 339, 357-58 (2007).
104Sutcliffe, supra note 103, at 135. Varun Gauri, Senior Economist at the World Bank,
suggests that now the transfer of labor is from low-productivity agriculture to high-productivity agriculture. Varun Gauri, Comment Made From the Audience at Symposium on
Distributive Justice and International Law at Tillar House (Nov. 7, 2008).
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place. Rather, Europe developed, and as a result, nations polarized into
developed and underdeveloped states. This was set and unalterable by
the end of the nineteenth century. As Sutcliffe explains, "Underdevelopment is, like Dorian Gray's portrait, development's alter ego." 105 The
underdeveloped states can never catch up, in part because of all the
trash-from environmental degradation to corrupt regimes-the developed states have left in their way
Second, the attainability critique is grounded in the realization
that it is physically impossible for the whole world to reach the same
destination, to enjoy the level of consumption enjoyed by those in the
West. Rather, because of greenhouse gases, contaminants, and nonrenewable resources, "development" "cannot be generalized ... without
10 6
causing an apocalypse."
Third, and finally, a broad range of desirability critiques suggest
that not everyone aspires to such levels of consumption. These critiques
are diverse, ranging from those who seek spiritual, rather than material
fulfillment, to those living off the land or off the grid, who seek a different kind of material fulfillment. What these critiques have in common is their rejection of high consumption/high productivity. They see
"[rich developed states] full of needy, oppressed and unfulfilled people. "107 In short, even if it were possible for the entire world to live like
Americans, many would rather not.
The metanarrative of development raises more questions than it
answers. It is economically, politically, and normatively problematic.
While there are some inspiring success stories, overall the story of development is dismal.'0 8 It is jarringly out of sync with the liberal
metanarrative of progress.
B. The CulturalLogic ofLate Capitalism

Even if distributive justice was its objective, 'international economic law' could neither mandate nor further distributive justice be105Sutcliffe, supra note 103, at 136 (emphasis omitted).
106 JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: How SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 498
(2005); Sutcliffe, supra note 103, at 137. Daniel Butt suggests a sensible response to this
critique with his notion of "sufficientarianism." Daniel Butt, Global Equality of Opportunity as
an InstitutionalStandard of DistfibutiveJustice, in DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 10.
107 Sutcliffe, supra note 103, at 138.
108 See, e.g., ESCOBAR, supra note 40, at 103-211 (discussing the transformation of
strategies for development and those strategies' new problems and successes); supra notes
2, 10-12, and Part I.C.
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cause 'international economic law' is not a legal subject with the capacity to do so. Almost twenty years ago, Schlag identified this dilemma in
American law as "the problem of the subject." 10 9 At that time the question of "who or what it is that thinks or produces law" 110 became a major focus of domestic legal theory"' In contrast, it has not been a focus
of international law because the authority of international law is not
taken for granted in the same way.
In fact, the authority of international law has been under relentless
attack in this country During the Cold War, as Harold Koh explains,
self-described "realists" in the U.S. saw international law as "naive and
virtually beneath discussion."" 2 Those who defended international law
in the U.S. were more inclined to circle the wagons, to insist that international law really was law, than to question its fidamental premises. 113 Indeed, under the popular logic of the day such questioning
114
could only aid the enemy.
109See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1629 (1991).
110Id.
ill See, e.g., Drucilla L. Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination
and the Potentialfor Transfornative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1135-37
(1988); Martha Minow, Identities, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97, 98-100 (1991); Mary Jane
Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatistand PoststructuralistCritical Legal Practice,139 U. PA.
L. REV. 1019, 1019-55 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67
TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1195-243 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 167, 167-90 (1990); Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Inconamensurability in ConstitutionalLaw, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1442-69 (1990).
112 Harold Hongju Koh, Mhy Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2616 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAVES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOWEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) and THoMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)). For a postCold War example of such an attack, see Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
InternationalLaw as FederalCommon Law: A Critiqueof the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV.
815, 834-38 (1997) (arguing that the Restatement incorrectly elevates customary international law).
11 See, e.g., Harold Hongj
Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1824, 1861 (1998) (concluding that international law, the "law of nations," is more
properly viewed as the supreme law of the land).
14 This ironically reproduced the silencing of proponents of international law by the
"realists." See Koh, supra note 112, at 2615 (describing the view that, "utopian moralizing
about world government... like the strategy of appeasement, played into the hands of the
Communist bloc"). Koh himself, for example, while noting the postmodern proliferation
and fragmentation of "international law, transnational actors, decisional fora, and modes
of regulations [which] mutate into fascinating hybrid forms," firmly grounds his analysis in
Anglo-American liberalism. Id. at 2630.
While postmodernism has been criticized in the domestic context for similar reasons, no
one credibly argues that "might makes right" in the domestic context. See, e.g., infra note 122.
Critical theorists are constrained by the self-limiting social contract of the liberal state. In the
international context, in contrast, that constraint evaporates. See Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan
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The decade following the end of the Cold War, bracketed by the
first Iraq war and 9/11, was a tumultuous period for international law.
In 1999, the AmeicanJournalof InternationalLaw published a Symposium
on Method in InternationalLaw.115 The organizers, Steven R. Ratner and
Anne-Marie Slaughter, sought to "provide a greater grasp of the major
theories of international law currently shared by scholars." 116 They described the often jerky crossover of scholarly innovations from domestic
law to international law and the Symposium showed how seven such
"methods" had successfully made the leap. 117 Postrnodernisn was conspicuous by its absence from this list-an absence attributable, at least
in part, to ongoing ontological challenges to international law. Such
challenges include ongoing charges that international law is not 'law' at
all. 118
Thus, American internationalists have been reluctant to recognize
the problem of the subject-that is, that there may be no identifiable
subject, or coherent principle, that "makes or produces" international
economic law-since this might be construed as support for the
broader, far more dubious, proposition that international law is whatl
ever the United States says it is.
1 But this conflates a normative project
Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022, 1033-37 (2007) (reviewing KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: E-ruics IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS (2006); KIWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHIcs
OF IDENTITY (2005); and MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITV, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006)) (explaining the problems of extrapolating from
state-centered liberal theory).
115Symposium on Methods in InternationalLaw, 93 AAM.J. INT'L L. 291(1999).
116 See Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International
Law: A Prospectusfor Readers, 93 AM.J. INT'L L. 291, 292 (1999).
117 See id. at 292-93. The seven methods selected, with many lawyerly disclaimers and
caveats, were: "legal positivism, the New Haven School, international legal process, critical
legal studies, international law and international relations, feminist jurisprudence, and law
and economics." Id. at 293.
118 I have explained the reasons for postmodernism's absence from the Symposium,
and the ways in which it nonetheless characterized the Symposium itself in other scholarship. See Barbara Stark, After/word(s): 'Violations of Human Dignity' and Postmodcrn International Law, 27 YALEJ. INT'L L. 315, 317 (2002). There may be additional reasons, however.
See, e.g., Lodge, supra note 26, at 43 (explaining how "the excruciating effort of construing
this jargon-heavy [postmodern] discourse far exceeded the illumination likely to be
gleaned from it, so [general readers] stopped reading it").
119 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customaiy InternationalLaw, and the Continuing
Relevance ofErie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 891-909 (2007) (arguing that Sosa rejects the position that customary international law (CIL) has the status of self-executing federal common law); Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization and the IWar on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2091-102 (2005) (arguing for an extremely expansive
executive role); Julian G. Ku, GubernatorialForeign Policy, 115 YALE LJ. 2380, 2410-15
(2006) (arguing for an expansive view of executive power); John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U.
CHI. L. REv. 729, 744-75 (2004) (defending the Bush Administration's use of force). But
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(that international law, in general, should serve the interests of the
West) with a descriptive project (that international economic law, in
particular, may have no coherent objective at all).
Rather, international economic law's objectives are shaped by the
"cultural logic of late capitalism." 120 For Jameson, this means the cornmodification of everything, including art and human well-being. Everything has a price, and everything is for sale. As Schlag points out:
"[0] urs is a world ... where the value of freedom implies at once the
downfall of the Berlin Wall and the imbibing of Pepsi."'121 The problem
of distributive justice becomes a marketing problem.
This cultural logic not only allows us to recognize the problem of
extreme poverty it ironically commodifies it by generating a range of
money-making responses, two of which are especially pertinent here.
First, a personal charity became the "must-have" commodity of the hyper-rich. 2 2 As journalist Alessandra Stanley observed, "After 25 years of
ever-escalating exorbitance, the pendulum has swung towards conspicuous nonconsumption. Extravagance is measured not by how much is
see MARY-ELLEN O'CONNELL, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INT'L LAW, THE MYTH OF PREEMPTIVE

SELF-DEFENSE 3 (2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf (stating
"the United States as a government has consistently supported the prohibition on such
preemptive use of force"); Koh, supra note 112, at 2659 ("By interpreting global norms,
and internalizing them into domestic law, [participation in the transnational legal process]
leads to reconstruction of national interests and eventually national identities."). I do not
mean to suggest that internationalists are not interested in the question of "who or what
makes or produces" international law. Indeed, there is large and growing scholarly literature, including works on: cosmopolitanism, see APPIAH, supra note 114; NUSSBAUM, supra
note 114; global networks, see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, America's Edge: Power in the Networked Century, 88 FOREIGN AFFS. 94
(2009); deliberative democracy, see SLAUGHTER, supra, at 194; Richard Falk, What Comes
After Westphalia: The Democratic Challenge, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 243 (2007); Andrew Strauss,
Considering Global Democracy An Introduction to the Symposium: Envisioning a More Democratic
Global System, 13 WIDENER L. REv. i (2007); Symposium: Envisioninga MoreDemocratic Global
Democracy, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 1 (2007).
'20JAMESON, supra note 94, at xv.
121 SCHLAG, supra note 101, at 47. See generally Said, supra note 49, at 9-13(explaining
why imperialism must be understood in cultural, as well as political and economic terms).
122 See, e.g., James Traub, The Celebrity Solution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 9, 2008, at 40
(explaining how "Hollywood celebrities have become central players on deeply political
issues like development aid"); Action Without Borders, How We're Funded, http://www.
idealist.org/en/about/funding.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2009) (discussing earned income from "Idealist Consultant and Vendor Directory" and "Idealist Nonprofit Career
Fairs"). The point is not that such projects are necessarily suspect. In fact, some of these
projects may well involve the kind of "piecemeal problem solving" suggested infra note
145. There is, however, always the risk that such projects will become too successful. See, e.g.,
Elisabeth Malkin, Microloans, Big Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2008, at C4 (noting that, while
"[p]rofit is not a dirty word in the microfiance world," a return of 19.6% raises questions).
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spent, but by how much is given away. "123 Bill Gates, for example, vowed
24
to eradicate polio.1

Second, multinational corporations agreed to donate a portion of
their profits. Bono's charity enlisted companies, including Dell and

The Gap, to market lines which donate a portion of their profits to aid
Africa.1 25 Pursuant to the cultural logic of late capitalism, global poverty
would be addressed by shopping, that is, by the very overconsumption
that perpetuates it.
Just as conspicuous consumption became a status symbol in Theodore Veblen's day conspicuous philanthropy became a status symbol in
ours. 1 26 Getting photographed with African children makes celebrities

look "good"-not only attractive, but moral as well. Italso distracts the
public from negative publicity' 127 Angelinajolie, for example, starred in
an MTV documentary on The Poverty Crisis in Africa.128
The idea that the extremely well-off should give some of their
wealth to the needy became part of the zeitgeist, the air we breathe and
the coffee we drink. 129 This was true at least until the current economic
crisis. 130 A recent article in Fortune magazine recognized this truth when
123

at E7.

Alessandra Stanley, Humble Celebrity and Eager Interviewer, N.Y. TiNIES, June 22, 2006,

124 See BILL GATES, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION, 2009 ANNUAL LETTER FROM
BILL GATES 14 (2009), available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/annual-letter/Documents/ 2009-bil-gates-annual-letter.pdf. Gates recently helped raise $600 million to do $o.
See id.
125 See Ron Nixon, Bottom Line for (Red), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2008, at Cl.
126 See generallyTHEODORE VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 69-101 (1899).
127 See, e.g., Cate Dory, Who s the Most Charitableof Us All? Celebrities Don "t
Ahays Make the
List, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2007, at C7 (notingJolie's acknowledgement that her charitable
work distracts the public from her "colorful" personal life).
128 Bill Saporito, TheJeffSachs Contradiction:Celebrity Economist, TIME, Mar. 14, 2005, at
50; "Diary".The Diary of Angelina Jolie and Dr Jeffrey Sachs in Africa (MTV television broadcast, Sept. 14, 2005). Sachs has been called the "macroeconomist to the stars." Daniel W.
Drezner, Brother Can You Spare $195 Billion?, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REv., Apr. 24, 2005, at 18.
129 See, e.g., Starbucks Coffee Company Advertisement, We Have Something in Common,
N.Y. TiNIES, Aug. 27, 2006, at N17 ("[In the clean water campaign to raise $10 million,
Starbucks partnered with] non-governmental organizations to bring clean water, improved
sanitation, and hygiene education to villages in need. Wvhat's amazing is that once these
basic needs are fulfilled, opportunities for education, agrictlture, and commerce emergechildren go to school, women start businesses, and the whole community begins to look
forward to the future, which, it should be said, is another thing we all have in common.").
I30 Jan M. Rosen, In Uncertain Times, Donors Hold Back, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, at G4
(noting that charities "have suffered in the economic maelstrom, while their services are
needed more than ever"). Bnt see Matthew Bishop, A Tarnished Capitalism Still Serves Philanthropy, N. Y TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, at F25 (noting that the need for philanthrocapitalism is
greater now than before, and philanthrocapitalists are looking to make "high performance" and "strategic" donations).
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it reported that "leaders of the hedge fund world have banded together
to fight poverty-taking gobs of money from the rich ... and making
philanthropy cool among the business elite." 31 The almost $65 billion
in aid pledged by Buffet and Gates dwarf the contributions of many
donor states, and they do not come with the same strings. As Singer
observes, "Unconstrained by diplomatic considerations or the desire to
swing votes at the United Nations, private donors can more easily avoid
dealing with corrupt or wasteful governments. They can go directly into
the field, working with local villages and grass-roots organizations. " 1 32
Indeed, private charity may well be more effective than public
rights, especially if the former means billions of dollars and the latter
means empty promises. But while charity can be a force for good, it is
not a particularly dependable force. In the face of a global economic
crisis, donors may simply change their minds with regard to past, present, and future pledges. 133 Even though the impact of the current
global economic crisis on international donors is an open question, we
can see that no one is more vulnerable to shifting social mores than the

131See Andy Serwer, The Legend of Robin Hood, FORTUNE, Sept. 18, 2006, at 103; see also
Jim Dwyer, Out of Sight, Till Now, And GivingAway Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at BI
(describing how Chuck Feeney, who made billions from duty-free airport shops, had
anonymously given $4 billion to projects ranging from AIDS clinics in South Africa to plastic surgery for children with facial deformities in the Philippines; and $600 million to his
alma mater, Cornell). Feeney says that he went public to inspire other billionaires to discover the pleasures of philanthropy. See MATTHEW BISHOP & MICHAEL GREEN, PHILANTHROCAPITALISM: How THE RICH CAN SAVE THE WORLD 13, 45, 145-47 (2008) (discussing

Feeney's secret and ground-breaking philanthropic efforts); Dwyer, supra.
132 Peter Singer, What Should a BillionaireGive-and What Should You ?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Dec. 17, 2006, at 58, 62. (noting that, adjusted for inflation, the contributions of Buffet are
more than double the lifetime total [of Carnegie and Rockefeller combined]"). The
consequences" of these contributions are generally imposed on recipient states. See, e.g.,
DEP'T OF Soc. & EcON. AFFAIRS, supra 78, at 30 (describing programme tinder which LDCs
can obtain debt relief after meeting "certain criteria"). Donor states, in contrast, merely
face an increasingly disappointed Ban Ki-Moon, U.N. Secretary General, when they fail to
meet promised goals. Id. at 3; see also Celia Dugger, U.S. Agency's Slow PaceEndangers Foreign
Aid, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at Al (noting that the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a
federal agency established almost four years ago, has spent only $155 million of the $4.8
billion approved for aid projects).
133 See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 134. Some charities are criticized. See, e.g., Christopher
Dickey, 'I Was Transformed: Angelina Jolie on Refugees and Fame, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 11, 2007,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/34023

(asking Jolie, "Do you worry about people who say

this is celebrity tourism?", to which Jolie responded, "At the end of the day... a lot of criticism could keep a lot of people from doing this kind of work. [A] lot of people ...

don't want to combine artists with foreign policy. And hey, I understand.").

just
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poor. 134 Furthermore, charity does not mandate a careful distribution
of costs or benefits, or provide an antidote for donor fatigue. 135
Finally, even in the case of these private charities, the lion's share
of benefits raised remains in the developed states. Western advertising
firms, for example, have been the major beneficiaries of the widely recognized "Red" campaign. Red companies spent as much as $100 million in advertising to raise $18 million for Africa.1 36 Moreover, the Red
companies stop giving as consumers stop spending. 137 Each of these
variables make evident that private charity is no panacea for the problem of global poverty.
CONCLUSION: WHAT ABOUT TODAY?

This is a question that neither Marx nor the postmodernists deign
to answer, for similar reasons. For Marx, any answer is subject to the
"false consciousness" that inspires it; that is, the fttile hope that there is
a possibility of authentic "species-life" within capitalism. For the postmodernists, the question shows the questioner's inability to let go of
the Enlightenment metanarrative. Surely reason and science, pumped
up by our unprecedented ability to generate and manipulate data, will
13 8
lead to a solution. Alice cannot stop arguing with the Queen.
Perhaps, this Article suggests, she is wasting her time. As Schlag
observes, "One might think that destruction is inherently bad and conSee POGGE, supra note 9, at 2; Stephanie Strom, Bracingfor Lean Times Ahead, N.Y.
Nov. 11, 2008, at F1 (asking whether philanthropy, "like the housing and financial
markets, [was] riding a bubble that has finally burst?"). Some of these pledges have already
been paid, hopefully in cash. Louise Story, Hedge Funds'SteepFall Sends Investors Fleeing,N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at Al (noting that hedge funds, which defined "the era of Wall Street
hyper-wealth," have lost $180 billion in the last three months).
135 Stephanie Strom, Big Gifts, Tax Breaks, and a Debate on Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
2007, at A22 (noting that "roughly three-quarters of charitable gifts of $50 million and
more ... went to universities, private foundations, hospitals and art museums").
134

TIMES,

136 Nixon, supra note 129.

137SeeDavid Leonhardt, Buying Binge Slams to a Halt,N.Y. TInIES, Nov. 12, 2008, at Al.
138 Alice seems to find restraining herself from the fruitless squabble particularly hard
as she is, in essence, a lawyer for the poor, the female, or the otherwise subordinated. In a
2003 Symposium on Professor Schlag's work, those who focused on such groups were generally critical. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Romancing the Real, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 573, 574-80
(2003); Joanne Conaghan, Schlag in IWonderland, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 543, 544-58 (2003)
("[A]s a feminist, I cannot help but be struck by the total lack of engagement with feminist
and critical race scholarship."); Deborah Maranville, Building a Better Sandcastle: Fantasy,
Growth, and the Enchantment of Reason, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1007, 1008-25 (2003); Daria
Roithmayr, "Easy for You to Say": An Essay on Outsiders, the Usefulness of Reason, and Radical
Pragmatism, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 939, 939-41 (2003) (critiquing Schlag because his argument fails "to take into account the needs and concerns of women and people of color").
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struction inherently good" but ....it all depends on what is being de-

stroyed and what is being constructed." 139 As Roy Boyne and Ali Rattansi point out, there is a "postinodernism of 'resistance' as well as a
postmodernism of 'reaction." 140 Neither should be left unprobed.
You do not have to be a Marxist to share Marx's conviction that
"the destiny of our world as a whole is tied up with the condition of its
poorest and most disadvantaged members." 14 1 Nor do you have to be a
Marxist to realize that the playing field is not level, and that the winners
may not even notice. 142 Likewise, you do not have to be a postnodernist to reject the metanarrative of development or to doubt that rich celebrities and more shopping will promote distributive justice. Nor, must
you accept the metanarrative of development to believe that the lives of
the poorest should, and can, be better. Indeed, it may be necessary to
destroy that metanarrative, or "turn it inside out" as Jeffrey Dunoff suggests, to even imagine what might actually work. 143
Dunoff urges would-be reformers to step aside and leave "development" to those who would be developed. 144 Rittich takes a similar
position by urging the would-be developers to "create space for local
alternatives."' 45 She reminds us that her advice is grounded in the foundational norm of self-determination, "the intuition behind [which]
139 PIERRE SCHLAG, TiuE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 68 (1998).
140 Boyne & Rattansi, supra note 91, at 29.
141Judt, supra note 21, at 9.
142 See, e.g.,
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED: WHY W87E
NEED A GREEN

REVOLUTION-AND How IT CAN RENEW AMERICA 26-52, 72-100 (2008); THOMAS L.
FRIEDMAN, ThIE WORLD Is FLAT 48-172, 225-75 (2005).
143 SeeJeffrey Dunoff, The Inside-Out Logic of the WTO's DistributiveJustice Debate, in DIsTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 10; see also Muna
Ndulo, Imagine a World Without Hunger: The Hurdles of GlobalJustice, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
779, 783 (2006) (arguing that human rights are necessary but not sufficient to "implement
the fundamental economic right to survival"); Marius Pieterse, Eating Socioeconomic Rights:
The Usefultess of Rights Talk in Alleviating Social HardshipRevisited, 29 HuM. RTS. Q. 796, 797,
819-22 (2007).
144 Dunoff, supra note 143. As Easterly concludes: "Aid won't make poverty history,
which Western aid efforts cannot possibly do. Only the self-reliant efforts of poor people
and poor societies themselves can end poverty, borrowing ideas and institutions from the
West when it suits them to do so." EASTERLY, supra note 46, at 382-83; see also Skeel, supra
note 84, at 699 (citing Milhaupt and Pistor for the proposition that "[i]nternally generated
changes will prove more successful than pure transplants ... and the effectiveness of
transplants will vary depending on how well the local interests adapt them to local circumstances."). See generally Samantha Powers, For Terrorists, a War oniAid Groups, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2008, at A19 (discussing the "nationaliz[ation]" of foreign field operations by
.sending conspicuous Westerners home").
145 Rittich, supra note 14, at 738; see also COLLIER, supra note 9, at 191 ("Westerners
have to give up our grand ambitions. Piecemeal problem-solving has the best chance of
success.") (citing William Easterly).
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is that important... legal reforms... should be made ... by those who
will have to live with the consequences."146

Taking such advice does not mean that the rich North should disengage from the poor South, however, because the time for that has
passed.' 47 Neither should reformers forget earlier efforts and earlier
failures. In the 1970s, for instance, the industrialized states attempted
to block a major initiative by the former colonies of the European powers to establish a New International Economic Order (NIEO). 148 Their
numbers enabled the former colonies to pass resolutions in the General Assembly over the objections of the Western industrialized states.
Nevertheless, when Libya tried to nationalize Western property without
adequate compensation, as the NIEO would have allowed, it was firmly
49

rebuffed. 1
But it is not too late to ask whether, as Marxists suggest, interna-

tional economic law's most important client is the neoliberalism that
created it, or whether as the postmodernists might argue, "international economic law" is not a subject with the capacity to change direc146See Rittich, supra note 14, at 738. This might include simply ignoring the advice of
Western experts. Malawi, for example, went from famine to surplus by helping farmers buy
fertilizer, contrary to the advice of the World Bank. Celia W. Dugger, Ending Famine, Simply
by Ignoringthe Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2007, at Al.
147 See, e.g., Jonathan Harr, Lives of the Saints: International HardshipDuty in Chad, NEW
YORKER, Jan. 5, 2009, at 47 (describing vast refugee camps entirely dependent on foreign
aid for daily sustenance). Easterly, too, recognizes the need for aid "in the meantime": "But
aid that concentrates on feasible tasks will alleviate the sufferings of many desperate people in the meantime. Isn't that enough?" EASTERLY, supra note 46, at 383.
148The former colonies, then newly-independent states, were known as the "Group of
77." See U.N. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Orde, G.
A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/9556 (May 1, 1974). This initiative gave light to the fact
that the developing countries constituted seventy percent of the world's population, but
accounted for only thirty percent of the world's income. See id 1. Some argued that the
developed states owed them compensation for colonialism and the benefits the developed
states still reaped from it. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 14, at 126-27 (noting that for those
who possess wealth, surrendering more of that wealth begins to look confiscatory); R.P.
Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African States Toward Certain Problems of International Law, 15
INT'L. & COMp. L. Q. 55, 55-56 (1966) (discussing international law and the increasing
involvement of Asian and African states). Accordingly, the NIEO was interpreted very differently in different places. The American financial and corporate establishment found it
confiscatory-although the liberal intellectuals were inclined to interpret it more modestly. These liberal intellectuals viewed NIEO as a global version of policies that had become politically acceptable in the United States during the New Deal. Differently, in the
developing countries, the NIEO was often seen as the absolute minimum demanded by
elemental standards of fairness.
149See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1 (Int'l Arb.
Trib. 1978). As Anghie observes, "[Flew of the NIEO initiatives had an enduring impact
on international law and the international economic system." ANGHIE, supra note 36, at
245.
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Rather, like normative legal thought, "[international economic
law] will [simply] tell you what to do even though there is not the
' 51
1
slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it.
There may be little to lose by "laying down the law," as Schlag suggests,
and recognizing that the Queen, along with her entourage, is nothing
but a pack of cards. 152

e.g., Upendra Baxi, Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights, 8 TRANS125, 163-64 (1998) ("[T]he paradigm of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is being steadily supplanted by a trade-related, market-friendly,
human rights paradigm .... [This] insists ... upon the promotion and protection of the
collective rights of global capital in ways that 'justify' corporate well-being and dignity over
that of human persons.").
'51 SCHLAG, supra note 101, at 28; see Howse, supra note 19, at 1534 (finding that
Stiglitz shows that "problems with global economic liberalism identified by the antiglobalizers-such as environmental commons issues, the democratic deficit, and weak and corrupt states-require solutions at the global level"); Williams, supra note 20, at 1 (noting
that "Marx long ago observed the way in which unbridled capitalism became a kind of
mythology, ascribing realit); power and agency to things that had no life in themselves").
This being said we are left asking who, exactly, can provide such solutions?
152 See CARROLL, supra note 1, at 124. This is the realization, of course, with which the
dreaming Alice finally awakes. See id.
150 See,
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